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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 241

Accident time: not recorded

Accident Date: 06/08/1998

Where it occurred: Qualat (Zabul),
Garmab

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: grass/grazing area
metal fragments

Date record created: 17/02/2004

Date last modified: 17/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate metal-detector (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
request for long handtool (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
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Accident report
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made available in
September 1999. The following summarises its content.
At the time of the accident the demining group was using a one-man drill and two-man
teams.
The victim had been a deminer for seven years. He had last been on leave 13 days before
and last attended a revision course five months before. The accident occurred on ground
described as grazing land in "medium condition". The mine was identified from pieces found
at the site.
The investigators decided that the victim was working with a detector when he got a signal
from a fragment that was visible, half buried. He squatted to remove it with his bayonet but
as he did so initiated a mine that was under the fragment. His visor "was not properly down"
and he failed to centre the reading point and approach it at the angle dictated by the SOPs.
The victim suffered injuries to his hands and his face, the latter including a lacerated lip and
damaged teeth. The victim walked to the safe area.
The victim's visor and bayonet were damaged.
He was treated on site and taken to the ICRC hospital in Kandahar.
The Team Leader said that the deminer was careless when the accident occurred but had
found six mines over the last few days and was a good deminer. He suggested that such
incidents could be avoided by allowing the use of a pick, by bolting visors in a down position
and by persuaded deminers to apply procedures.
The Section Leader said that the victim was working properly with his visor down when the
accident occurred. The victim prodded too close to the reading which caused the accident.
The victim said he was prodding with a bayonet when the accident occurred and may have
used it at the wrong angle. He claimed to have placed markers as required. He said that
such incidents could be prevented if a pick was used instead, that detectors should work
properly, and that the reading was investigated in a prone position.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim prodded in a squatting position at the wrong
angle at the centre of a detector reading without lowering his visor.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that deminers should treat all readings as a mine, prodding
should always be done prone, that even visible fragments should be prodded using proper
procedures and that supervisors should ensure that procedures are properly adhered to
"especially prodding when a small mistake could be the last one".
Photocopies of photographs of the damaged visor and bayonet were not clear. The bayonet
handle was broken but may not have shattered. The visor face did not appear badly
damaged.

Victim Report
Victim number: 314

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded
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Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: helmet

Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Chest
minor Hand
severe Eyes
severe Face
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
An initial casualty report recorded the injuries as:
"Both eye injury and mult small wounds on the face and chest and laceration of lower lip.
Semicomatose."
The field report and medic's sketch did not include details of injuries.
The field doctor described the injuries as: "both eye injuries. Face injury. Multiple injury on
chest. Injury on index finger".
The victim reported injuries on his face, right hand and "lap".
A photocopy of a photograph of the victim in the file provided no detail at all.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
victim was not wearing his visor properly from which I infer that he was inadequately
supervised. Neither his "controlling" partner not the Team Leader told him to lower his visor.
It is also possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen
frequently during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable protective
equipment represents a management failing.
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements. The failure of
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt SOPs for local conditions, or enforce
their own standards may be seen as a further management failing.
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